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Disparities in Social Assistance Receipt between 
Immigrants and Natives in Sweden 
 
Social assistance receipt among immigrants in relation to receipt among natives in Sweden is 
investigated. A background of how the system is constructed is provided, statistical 
information reported, the literature surveyed and key results interpreted. Most out-payment 
for social assistance in Sweden refers to foreign born persons although the category makes 
up 14 percent of the population. While some part of the high costs can be attributed to needs 
to maintaining recent refugees, this is not the entire story. Immigrants tend to assimilate out 
of social assistance receipt. However, receipt continues to be higher than among in several 
characteristics identical natives many years after immigration among immigrants from not rich 
countries. The elevated probabilities of social assistance receipt among immigrants from not 
rich countries are mainly due to failures of integrating into the labor market at the destination. 
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 1.  Introduction  
 
The Swedish social welfare system is by many perceived as having a number of attractive 
characteristics. Thus in international comparisons Sweden is often found in the group of 
countries having the lowest incidence of financial poverty, see for example OECD (2008). 
Major reasons for such a favorable state are comparatively high labor force participation of 
men as well as by women and the existence of a relatively generous income safety net. 
However, the access to and the generosity of social insurance payments depend on household 
members qualifying by working for pay. Recently arrived immigrants as well as young adults 
have typically not qualified to for example unemployment compensation and are therefore 
more likely than others to turn to social assistance: the last income safety-net.      
 
During the 50, 60 and first half of the 70s did most foreign born arrive as work migrant or as 
their relatives. They originating with few exceptions from European countries and most 
became well integrated into the Swedish labor market. The proportion of refugees and their 
family members has been much larger in the immigrant streams that arrived during the 80s 
and thereafter. The origin has also changed towards a larger proportion of people from middle 
and low income countries. Many of those “new” immigrants differ substantially from the 
majority population by appearance and name. The fact that many immigrants who arrived 
during the 80s and thereafter are not well integrated into the Swedish labor market is widely 
acknowledged and subject to much concern.  
 
The seriousness of the issue shows up in that a minority rich countries now-days face a larger 
employment gap between foreign born and native born than Sweden. (OECD, 2009) This 
must also be deemed as the major reason why a much larger proportion of foreign born than 
native born receive social assistance. Foreign born also on average have longer periods of 
social assistance receipt than natives. Higher rates of receipt and longer duration lead to that 
since some years most public expenditures for social assistance in contemporary Sweden are 
the out payments to foreign born recipients. 
 
The task for this paper is to provide an overview of the issue of social assistance receipt 
among immigrants to Sweden and put it in relation to receipt by natives. It is based on 
knowledge of relevant institutions, published statistical information and the relevant literature. 
We also presents previously not published estimates of social assistance receipt among 
natives and immigrants, as well as of the poverty reducing effects of social assistance both 
based on the Household Income Survey 2003.  
 
The paper is laid out as follows: In the next section we provide a short description of the 
immigrant population in Sweden. We inform in Section 3 on how the Swedish social 
assistance system is constructed. The topic for Section 4 is the norms utilized in the social 
assistance provision, while Section 5 presents statistical information on the extent of social 
assistance receipt and policy goals. Statistical information on disparities in social assistance 
receipt between immigrants and natives are reviewed in Section 6, while Section 7 deals with 
research on the same issue. Section 8 discusses that the relatively high social assistance 
receipt among some immigrants can be understood from the perspectives of immigrant’s lack 
of integration in the labor market at the destination, holes in the income safety net and 
possibly also other factors. Finally Section 9 ends the paper with some concluding comments.       
 
 
2.  Sweden’s immigrant population  
  2 
Sweden’s experience as immigrant country is relatively recent. At the beginning of World 
War II very few foreign born persons lived in Sweden, but since then many waves of 
immigrants have crossed the boarders. While the foreign-born population numbered 1.8 
percent in 1950, the proportion had grown to 7.5 percent in 1980. At the end of 2008 
1  280  000 foreign born persons lived in Sweden, which constitutes 13.8 percent of a 
population numbering in total 9 260 000 persons. However, in the public debate is the term 
“immigrant” not restricted to people who are foreign born. Statistics Sweden report that at the 
end of 2008 17.9 percent of the population in Sweden, 1 661 000 persons, had a foreign 
background. Those numbers includes in addition to persons being born abroad Swedish born 
having two foreign born parents. The numbers would have been still higher if also native born 
persons having one foreign born and one native born parent were included. Many foreign born 
persons and their children have received a Swedish citizenship. At the end of 2008 did the 
foreign citizens make up 562 000 persons or 6.1 percent of the population in Sweden.    
 
/Table 1 about here/  
 
Using information on the situation in January 2009 Table 1 list the 20 largest sending 
countries for foreign born to Sweden by name and number. A large heterogeneity in 
geographical distance to Sweden can be observed. The closest neighboring Nordic countries 
among which a common labor market has been in place for half of a century is well 
represented. Finland is the largest sender country of immigrants to Sweden and most such 
immigrants have a long period of residency at the destination. Furthermore, Denmark rank 
number eight and Norway number nine. Another group of large sender countries are other 
members of the European Union, an entity Sweden belongs to since the mid 90s and among 
which mobility nowadays faces few restrictions. To this group of sender countries counts 
Poland (rank 4), Germany (rank 7), Great Britain and Northern Ireland (rank 15) as well as 
Rumania (rank 18). Most migrants from the countries mentioned by name above, as well as 
those from the United States (rank 19), arrived for labor market reasons or for family reasons. 
Such a description also fit the migration population from the entity here labeled Yugoslavia, 
the third largest country of origin. The majority of those people arrived during the 70s.      
  
Iraq counts nowadays the second largest sender country among immigrants to Sweden, a 
population that has more than doubled since 2000. Most entered Sweden as refugees, for 
humanitarian reasons or as relatives to family members who had been admitted for such 
reasons. Such a description also fit the immigration populations born in Iran (a majority 
arriving during the 80s) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (a majority arriving during the 90s), the fifth 
and sixth largest sending county. The description also applies to the somewhat less numerous 
migrant populations from Chile, Somalia, Lebanon and Syria. Table 1 also inform on that 
Turkey rank number 10 and Thailand number 12 among countries of birth among immigrants 
to Sweden while the most populous countries in the world, China and India rank 17 and 20.  
 
A considerable proportion of Sweden’s more recently arrived immigrants originate from low 
or middle income countries and have not entered as labor migrants. Few other rich countries 
have during the later decades admitted equally many asylum seekers and their relatives in 
relation to their population size as Sweden.  A considerable proportion of the recent 
immigrants is Muslims, and many are by appearance and name easy to distinguish from the 
majority population. The immigrant population is younger than the native category. 
Metropolitan areas and larger cities have higher proportions of foreign born than smaller cities 
and rural areas.   
  3 
3.  The provision of social assistance
1 
 
To receive social assistance (“Försörjningsstöd”, “Ekonomikt bistånd” previously 
Socialbidrag) a person typically call the relevant Social Welfare Office. Some, but far from 
all, calls results in an appointment with a social worker.
2 The social welfare office is a branch 
of the local government and it is the local government (with exceptions discussed below) 
which finances the expenditures of social assistance. In Sweden there are 290 local 
governments and the rate of social assistance receipt in their population varied in 2008 from 
0.4 to 10.6 percent. For followers of Swedish media it comes as no surprise that the local 
government with the lowest rate of social assistance receipt is Vellinge and the highest one 
Södertälje. The first mentioned has become infamous for not admitting refugees.
3 The second 
has been known for although not having more than 80 000 inhabitants it has recently received 
a larger number of refugees from Iraq than United States and Canada together.
4    
 
Many local governments serve relatively small populations thus only one social welfare office 
is necessary, but the larger cities have several social welfare offices. While activities at the 
social welfare office are overseen by a board of local politicians, an applicant typically meets 
a social worker; a professional trained at a university or college. This can lead to the person 
putting in a formal claim. The applicant has to provide information on the structure of his or 
her family, various sources of income, assets as well as housing expenditures and in some 
cases other expenditures as well. A typical application refers to a period of one month. After 
such a meeting the social worker reviews the application which involves checking 
information provided by the applicant and performing calculations. 
 
Based on the review a decision is taken and communicated to the applicant a few days after 
application has been handed in. The following is a simplified description of the decision-
making process
5: People with disposable incomes lower than income thresholds laid down in 
norms and in other guidelines who cannot make a living in any other way receive social 
assistance. The sum closes the gap between disposable income and the relevant threshold as 
specified in the norm. The applicant is allowed to appeal the decision. To receive social 
assistance for a second month a member of the household is required to hand in a new 
application and the procedure is repeated. There is no time limit for how long a period a 
household can receive social assistance.  
 
The legal framework for the activities of the Social Welfare Offices consists of several layers. 
The parliament has passed the Social Welfare Act (originally in effect since 1982) though its 
present formulation came into work in 2002. This Act regulates a number of local government 
activities regarding social welfare. Chapter 4 of the Social Welfare Act regulates the 
individual's right to social assistance. The first paragraph states that persons who cannot meet 
their needs or have them met in other ways have a right to assistance from the Social Welfare 
Board for their maintenance (maintenance support, "Försörjningsstöd") or for their livelihood. 
This version of the act does not use the term "Socialbidrag" which was introduced when the 
                                                 
1 This and the next section summarise and update Gustafsson (2003).  
2 For empirical studies on how the intake functions see Minas (2005, 2006 and 2009)  
3 See Aftonbladet 20091122     http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article6166209.ab 
4 See Dagens Nyheter 20071122 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sodertalje-tar-emot-fler-irakier-an-usa-och-
kanada-1.599238 
5 Results for a series of empirical studies using hypothetical identical applications show a rather large variation 
in decisions. See for example Gustafsson et al. (1993) and Strantz (2007)   
  4law first came into effect 1982 and is still in popular use. The local government is obligated to 
provide social assistance independent of its financial situation thereby making it illegal to 
reject an application due to lack of local government resources.   
 
Please note that the Social Welfare Act does not list categories of persons entitled to social 
assistance. Any person residing in Sweden (regardless of nationality) is eligible with one 
exception. Practically indistinguishable from Försörjningsstöd / Ekonomiskt bistånd some 
recent immigrants are instead entitled to a specific benefit (“Introduction fee for refugees and 
some other foreigners”, “Introduktionsersättning för flyktingar och vissa andra utlänningar") 
in compliance with a particular act (1992:1068). These benefits are also provided by the local 
government, and are harmonised with those of the primary system of social assistance. If 
introduction assistance is provided a contract on integration is made between the local 
government and the recent refugee. The local government can then recover costs for 
providing assistance to new refugees from the central government. We will, as is usually the 
case, treat introduction assistance as a part of the Swedish system of social assistance.   
 
However, we will in the following sections of the paper, as typically the case, not include the 
system of old age social assistance (“Äldreförsörjningsstöd”) which can be claimed by 
persons aged 65 and older. Although it is in some aspects similar to Försörjningsstöd / 
Ekonomiskt bistånd it is administered by the social insurance offices and fully funded by the 
central government. Most recipients of old age social assistance are foreign born although 
some Swedish born persons who have returned after a period abroad also receive the benefit 
(Albertsson, 2008). This system, introduced in 2003, aims to fill holes in the basic penison 
system, as in its present form a residence record of at least 40 years is required to receive a 
full basic pension.
6   
 
The requirement for receipt of social assistance is that the benefit unit possesses a low income 
together with the inability to earn a living in any other way. A benefit unit consists of one or 
two adults (married or cohabiting) and their dependent children. A person is considered a 
child if under age of 18, or if secondary school is not completed. Parents are not legally 
required to support their adult children, and children are not required to support their parents.     
 
The rules in the Social Welfare Act imply, for example, that a household should try to support 
itself by paid work, by drawing on savings, or by selling assets. Only if such options are 
exhausted do not exist is a person eligible for social assistance. The rules also imply that 
unemployed persons typically have to show that they are registered at the employment office 
and are actively searching for a job. In a country where paid work is the norm for females 
(and public child care is heavily subsidised) this also applies to mothers of young children. 
The second paragraph in chapter 4 of the Social Welfare Act states that the social welfare 
board is allowed to provide assistance (Ekonomiskt bistånd) in addition to the reasons stated 
in the first paragraph. Local government thus has the right to top up benefits.
7  
 
                                                 
6 A single person over 65 with a monthly disposable income lower than 4 831 SEK per month (net of income 
taxes and housing costs) can be granted the benefit. Statistical information from the Social Insurance office show 
that in December 2008 11 854 persons received such benefits, and the costs for out-payments during 2008 as a 
whole was 431 million SEK. 
7 One can see this as a throwback to the past when each local government decided on the level for the norm. This 
was actually the case up to January 1998 when the norm applicable to all the country first came into play.  
 
  5The third paragraph of chapter 4 of the Social Welfare Act states that maintenance support 
(Försörjningsstöd) is given for the following costs:  
1.  Food, clothing and shoes, play and leisure, articles of consumption, health and hygiene 
and finally daily newspaper, telephone and TV licence. Those items are included in the 
norm (See Section 4).    
2.  Housing, electricity, travel to work, home insurance and finally fees for membership in a 
trade union and unemployment insurance society. Those are calculated on a case by case 
basis.  
 
The fourth paragraph of the Social Welfare Act states that the social welfare board can 
demand that persons receiving social assistance take part in certain measures (trainee jobs or 
other measures to increase competence) if the person has not been offered a suitable labour 
market policy measure and: 
1.  is under age 25. 
2.  Is over age 25 but due to circumstances is in need of measures to increasse competency, or 
3.  Is studying in a program for which student financial aid is available, but needs 
maintenance, in-between school terms 
 
If a person refuses to take part in activities assigned without an acceptable excuse income 
maintenance can be refused or reduced according to the forth paragraph of the Social Welfare 
Act. The same also applies if the person fails to attend assigned activities without an 
acceptable excuse.  
 
Some comments can be made on the content of paragraph 4 and those following it. These 
paragraphs did not have counterparts in the legislation in effect during the 80s and 90s. 
However, during the 90s with its high unemployment, ever-larger groups of young adults 
became social assistance recipients, for more on the issue see Salonen (2000). For example, 
Andrén and Gustafsson (2003) report that at age 22, 15 percent of those native born 1970 had 
experience of receiving social assistance as an adult. However, among those born in 1975 as 
many as 30 percent had at the same age had such an experience. Thus there was a strong trend 
of social assistance becoming a widespread benefit for young adults during the transition to 
adulthood. This process was triggered by the macroeconomy as unemployment among young 
adults increased dramatically at the beginning of the 90s (Lundborg, 2000). The new 
paragraphs of the Social Welfare Act can be regarded as the Swedish version of welfare 
reform, that is the trend to emphasise activity measures; a trend which is observable in this 
field of policy in several other countries as well.
8  
 
While the Social Welfare Act is rather general in its formulation, it is the job of the National 
Board of Health and Social Welfare ("Socialstyrelsen") to oversee the activities of the social 
welfare boards. The National Board of Health and Welfare provides information on the norm 
(decided by the government) as well as detailed advice on how to take decisions on social 
assistance. It has published recommendations as well as books (Socialstyrelsen 2000, 2003) 
each filled with more than 200 pages of detailed advices.  
 
 
4. Norms defining eligibility  
 
/Table 2 about here/  
                                                 
8 Studies that deal with the issue of evaluating activity programs / rules for social assistance receipt are Milton 
and Bergström (1998), Milton (2000a,b), Hallsten et al (2002), Giertz (2004) and Dahlberg et al (2008).   
  6 
We will in this section discuss the norms; Table 2 provides information on the levels in effect 
since January 2009 and applicable to at least December 2010. To compute the norm 
applicable to a specific benefit unit one has to add up the individual specific amounts and to it 
the amount defined by the number of persons. This means that the norm for a single person 
without children amounts to 3 680 SEK (per month) and for a couple without children to 6 
050 SEK (per month).
9 If there are dependent children the amounts increase for each 




Are the norms high or low? The answer might differ as different types of comparisons can be 
made. Seen over a period of one or several generations, and linking the norm to it’s previous 
equivalent, there is no doubt that the norms are much more generous than they were a long 
time ago, see Rauhut (2002). In contrast it might well the case that since the end of the 1980s 
has the purchasing power of the norms diminished. Comparisons are not straightforward as 
previously each local government had it’s own norm. However, Stranz (2007) shows based on 
a study of some local governments that in 2003/2004 a hypothetical applicant would face a 
norm expressing a lower purchasing power compared to what was the case one decade ago. 
Consistent with this Johnasson (2001) finds after having investigated changes in the law, 
regulations from the National Board of Health and Social Welfare and court cases as well as 
case studies of two local government that during the 90s provision of social assistance became 
more restricted or at least more selective than before.   
 
We have access to tabulations from the Household Income Survey at Statistics Sweden 
showing that median income for all households in 2003 was 165 913 SEK per equivalent 
adult.
11 In contrast, the median for households receiving social assistance at least during one 
month the same year was 106 453 SEK per equivalent adult, this means 64 percent of median 
for all households. The income level of social assistance recipients thus appears as relatively 
low.  
 
A norm of 3 680 SEK for a single person without children is indeed low when compared to 
wages for a full-time earner. Statistic Sweden reports monthly gross earning for a full-time 
worker in 2008.
12 The median was 24 000 SEK. Looking at the lower part of the distribution 
one observe that Sweden has no official minimum wage. However, we can turn to the 
earnings level for a cleaner at hotel or office at the 10
th percentile (by definition, 90 percent of 
the population of full-time cleaners earn more); 16 500 SEK. We can thus safely conclude 
that the norm for a single person without children is much lower than the earnings of a person 
with a low wages, see the following example. Assume that the single low earning person pays 
3 200 SEK in rent. This would require him or her to have a disposable income of less than 6 
880 SEK (gross of housing costs) to pass the income test for social assistance. This can be 
                                                 
9 As of January 2010 100 SEK were equal to 9.8 € or 14.3 USD. 
10 The amounts reported in Table 2 are based on the assumption that children receive a free lunch five days a 
week when placed in day care centers or involved in primary or secondary education.  The National Board of 
Health and Social Welfare provide breakdowns of the monthly costs covered by the norm. For example for a 
single adult (year 2009), 1 620 SEK is for food and beverages, 520 SEK for clothing and shoes, 400 SEK for 
leisure activities, and 260 SEK for hygiene. The remaining are for articles of consumption (110 SEK) as well as 
for daily newspaper, telephone and TV license (770 SEK).  
11 A commonly used equivalence scale in which the first adult person is assigned the value 1.0, each additional 
adult 0.7 and the value of 0.5 is added for each child under 18 is used.  
12 http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/SaveShow.asp     Accessed December 1,  2009.  For a study on 
people’s perception of adequate norm for social assistance see Halleröd (2004).  
  7compared to net income for the low-income earner in the example above which is slightly 
over around 11 000 SEK (net of income taxes but gross of housing costs).    
 
However, the situation can look rather different when the benefit unit has several non- 
working members. With an increased number of dependent children, the gap between income 
from employment and the social assistance norm decreases to eventually disappear. The 
classic issue of conflict between providing incentives to work and support to the needy is in 
the Swedish context very much related to two parent families with a large number of 
dependent children as well as to single parents, predominately single mothers.  
 
Two studies have modeled labor supply among single mothers in a framework where the level 
of the norm for social assistance is considered (Andrén 2003, Flood et al 2003) The results 
indicate that the level of the norm has a substantial effect on labor supply as well as receipt of 
social assistance among single mothers. For example a suggested reform reducing income 
taxes, the level of the social assistance norm and out of pocket payments for public child care 
(which are income related) is evaluated by Flood et al (2003). The reform would increase 
incentives for single mothers to work and the simulations indicate a changed labor supply of 
some mothers as well as a rather large drop in social assistance receipt. Many, but not all 
single mothers would gain from the reform as their disposable income would increase. Tax 
and benefit-policies can thus be judged to affect social assistance receipt among single 
parents. However, pay attention to that this can most likely not be generalized to single 
persons without children, the largest category of social assistance recipients.   
 
 
5. The number of social assistance recipients and policy goal  
 
Table 3 provides some key numbers of social assistance receipt in Sweden for each year 1983 
to 2008 based on publications from Statistics Sweden. The number of recipients, defined as 
persons living in a household that at least once during a year has received social assistance, 
has varied between 378 000 (2007) and 722 000 (1996), or from 4.1 percent of the population 
to 8,2 percent. While there is no long run trend in the rate of recipients, the extent of social 
assistance receipt in the population has been shown to be strongly influenced by the 
unemployment rate (Korpi, 1974, Gustafsson, 1984, Stenberg 1998. On this issue see also 
Brännström and Stenberg 2007). The deep downturn of the economy in the beginning of the 
1990s resulted in an expansion from 1991 to 1996 when the number of recipients grew by 46 
percent, average duration by 35 percent and out payments doubled. Thereafter and following 
the recovery of the economy did the number of recipients and outpayments decrease 
continuously to year 2007. However, quarterly statistics on out-payments shows that this 
development turned to it’s opposite during 2008 as the recent deep downturn of the world 
economy hit the Swedish economy. Out-payments of social assistance were for the three 
month period July – September 2009 19 percent higher than during the same period 2008. 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2009)    
 
/ Table 3 about here/  
 
A worrisome development is that there is a clear trend in periods of receipt being longer, see 
Table 3. While a household that received social assistance in 1983 were on average on the 
welfare roles for 4.2 months during a calendar year, the corresponding number had in 2008 
increased to 6.1 months, an increase by 45 percent. Almost all of the increase has taken place 
since the start of the deep economic downturn in the beginning of the 90s. The increased 
  8length of receipt is an important reason for total out payments in 2008 being larger than 
during the 1980s.   
 
In 2001 did the Government present the parliament with the following goal: “The government 
is now working to increase employment and justice in the society. As a consequence, the 
number of social assistance recipients should be cut in half between 1999 and 2004.” The goal 
was accepted by the parliament, and the government stated that each year it would report on 
how the goal was fulfilled. Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2001, Addendum 3) 
provided an operational definition of the goal. The underlying idea was to transform social 
assistance receipt of various lengths and amounts into full equivalents (full year and full 
receipt). It refers to households having a head 20 – 64 years of age and does not include 
introductory assistance to newly arrived refugees. This means that the goal was specified to 
reduce social assistance receipt from 115 200 full year equivalence in 1999 to 57 600 full year 
equivalence in 2004.  
 
The first reports to parliament indicated substantial decreases in social assistance receipt since 
1999. However, progresses came to a halt as the employment situation in the population 
worsened and in 2004 was the number of full year equivalence as high as 88 000. Thus the 
reduction of the number of full time equivalences since 1999 was only 24 percent, not 50 
percent meaning that the goal was not fulfilled. (Finansministeriet, Addendum 3, 2006). No 
attempt to formulate a new explicit goal on reducing social assistance receipt has thereafter 
been made.
13 However, a governmental commission has produced a more than 500 page long 
report with a battery of suggestions aiming to reduce social assistance receipt in the 
population (SOU 2007:2). In this, as well as in a new report by independent economists 
(Dahlberg, 2009) some of the proposed measures are directed towards immigrants receiving 
social assistance. At time of writing it remains to be seen if some of the suggested changes are 
going to be introduced.  
 
 
6.  Statistical information on disparities in social assistance use between immigrant and 
native  
 
/ Table 4 about here/  
 
Since some years information on social assistance receipt by nativity is reported in the official 
statistics. Table 4 presents foreign born and native born recipients by absolute numbers as 
well as rates of receipt within the relevant population category by age for 2008. It shows that 
the total number of foreign born recipients is actually slightly larger than the number of native 
born. The rate of receipt is six times higher among the foreign born than among native born. 
Generally, rates of receipt are the highest among young adults. As many as 32 percent of 
foreign born persons aged 18 to 19 were receiving social assistance in 2008, while the 
corresponding proportion among native born of the  same age was only 5 percent. Social 
assistance receipt is very low among middle aged and older native born persons. The official 
statistics also show that in 1990 did out-payment to foreign born households amount to 56 
                                                 
13  However, for the budget year 2008, information on the number of full time equivalence receivers of 
government transfers among people in work active ages were reported. (Finansminsteriet, Addendum 3, 2007) 
Among those a minority is social assistance recipients and thereby the focus was shifted towards measures to 
reduce the number of receivers in the systems of unemployment compensation, sickness benefits and disability 
pensions.      
 
  9percent of all out payments, a number that had increased to 63 percent in 2008. As much as 24 
percent of total out payments for social assistance in 2008 can be attributed to what in the 
statistics in defined as refugee households, that is to households that have received residence 
permit as refugees or for humanitarian reasons during the year or the three preceding years. A 
still larger proportion (39 percent of the total) is the out-payments for other foreign born and 
not more than 37 percent are the out payment to native born.    
 
/Table 5 about here/  
 
Further information is provided in Table 5 where we use the Household Income Survey at 
Statistics Sweden for 2003 to report estimated rates of social assistance receipt for natives, 
second generation of immigrants and first generation of immigrants as well as the number of 
persons belonging to the various categories.
14 Among adults do second generation 
immigrants, particularly those with two foreign born parents, have higher rates of receipt than 
native born. Among first generation immigrant adults from not rich countries stand out with a 
rate of receipt as high as 24 percent, to be compared to 3 percent among native born having 
two parents native born. Looking at rates of social assistance receipt from the perspective of 
children provides a supplementary view. Not more than 4 percent of native born children 
having two Swedish born parents lived in a household that received social assistance in 2003. 
However, the rate was two times as high if one of the parents was foreign born, and not less 
than 19 percent if both parents were foreign-born. The highest rates were found for children 
themselves born in not rich countries, among who as many as 38 percent lived in a household 
that had received social assistance in 2003.      
  
We can use the same data for an accounting exercise in order to find out to what extent social 
assistance reduces financial poverty as it is conceptualized and measured within the European 
Union (See Atkinson et al 2002). We draw poverty line at 40 alternatively 50 and 60 percent 
of the median income and report the proportions falling below them using two different 
definitions of disposable income: One excluding and one including receipt of social 




/Table 6 about here/   
 
Reading the content of Table 6 some findings emerge. Rates of poverty (after having 
considered social assistance receipt) are low among native born, only 6 percent among adults 
as well as children in case both parents also are native born. This is not due to social 
assistance, as rather low proportions of native born are taken out of poverty by social 
assistance. The situation is relatively similar among Swedish adults born having one or two 
foreign born parents, the second generation of immigrants, although they have higher rates of 
poverty. However, adults born in not rich countries have definitively high poverty rates (after 
taking social assistance payments into account): 26 percent. Very similar is the proportion 
among children born in Sweden having two foreign born parents as well as among children 
themselves born abroad.  
 
                                                 
14 For the estimates sampling weights developed by Statistics Sweden are used.  
15 This assumes that social assistance receipt do not affect income of households calculated as not including 
social assistance. Given the strictness of the means test once can argue this is a reasonably good first 
approximation.  
  10Table 6 also shows that social assistance makes relatively few immigrants cross a poverty line 
set at 60 percent of the median income. Social assistance has a much larger influence on 
immigrant poverty when focusing on the 40 percent of the median income poverty line – deep 
poverty. Among adults born in a not rich country does social assistance reduce such a 
proportion from 16 percent to 7 percent. Still larger is the reduction among immigrant 
children. Rather dramatically the proportion children born in not rich countries that falls under 
the 40 percent line drops from 21 to 3 percent when social assistance is considered in the 
calculations. Social assistance must thus be deemed as rather successful in reducing deep 
poverty among this category. Still it should be remembered that one in four native born 
children having two foreign born parents as well as among those children themselves foreign 
born fall under the 60 percent poverty line (after considering receipt of social assistance). This 
information is important from a policy perspective. It means that measures that aim to 
increase incentives for immigrants to work by reducing social assistance benefits have a risk 
of increasing child poverty and thus be in conflict with other policy goals.   
 
 
7.  Research on disparities in receipt between immigrant and natives 
 
Given the information provided in the previous section does it not comes as a surprise that the 
issue of social assistance receipt among immigrants to Sweden has been the subject of several 
research efforts, efforts that have focused on different aspects of receipt. Table 7 lists not less 
than 13 academic studies we are aware of that have used household data with an emphasis on 
shedding light on disparities of social assistance receipt between natives and immigrants.
16 
The table describes the studies by population studied, definition of immigrant, dimension of 
receipt studied, date and / or period studied as well as main results. With only one exception 
do all studies refer to the first generation of immigrants. Most studies have used register data 
for the 90s. 
 
The two first lines of Table 7 describe the earliest studies. Gustafsson (1986) report that the 
number of foreign citizens receiving social assistance had been increasing since the mid 60s. 
During the 70s and beginning of 80s foreign born had higher rates of receipt than the majority 
population. Rates were comparably high shortly after arrival and among immigrant with a 
non-Nordic citizenship. Franzén (1997) followed arrival cohorts of foreign born from 1983 to 
1992 and found rates of receipt to be high at arrival but thereafter decrease. The cohorts 
arriving 1988 had higher rates of receipt at arrival than the cohort arriving 1983. Studying a 
balanced panel for the years 1983 to 1992 it was found that while 11 percent of native born 
adults hade received social assistance at least once during the ten year period, the proportion 
was as high as 26 among foreign born.  
 
/ Table 7 about here/  
 
Several authors have used larger datasets of cross section information and estimated models 
explaining probabilities of receipt using as key explanatory variables age, years since 
immigration, education and origin. The third listed study, Hammarstedt (2000) is one 
example, the fourth listed Franzén (2001) another.
17 Table 8 report some results from the 
                                                 
16 In addition there are studies in witch rates of receipt at the level of the local government population is studied 
and that have used variables indicating the proportion of immigrants residing in the jurisdiction. See Byberg 
(2002) and studies there cited. Generally those studies find a positive association between the rate of immigrant 
and the rate of social assistance receipt.     
17 Hammarstedt (2000) also studied receipt of some other public transfers.  
  11second mentioned in the form of how predicted probabilities for receipt in 1995 vary by 
origin, education, and years since immigration for a single woman with no children aged 40. 
The table reports that while among natives receipt is rather unlikely for a longer educated 
person, this is not the case among newly arrived foreign born with the same level of 
education. Probabilities of receipt diminish rapidly by years since immigration and vary by 
country of origin. Probabilities of receipt among immigrants originating from rich countries 
are comparably low, while this is not the case among immigrants from not rich countries. 
Particularly high are the probabilities for newly arrived immigrants from such countries.  
 
/Table 8 about here/  
 
Using basically the same framework and similar variables did Hammarstedt and Ekberg 
(2004), study number 5, investigate social assistance receipt among second generation 
immigrants and natives in 1997. A major finding is that a non European background led to a 
higher probability of receipt. Another development of the same type of analysis is to pooled 
cross section in order to estimate effects of not only years since migration but also of arrival 
cohort. This was done by Hammarstedt (2009), study number 6, using data for 1990, 1995 and 
1999. Also in this study do the results indicate striking differences in probabilities of receipt 
between immigrants with different origins. Immigrants from rich countries were found to 
have rates of receipt relatively similar to the native population and they were not found to be 
affected by years since immigration. In contrast rates of receipt among immigrants from not 
rich countries are initially high, decrease by years since immigration and have increased 
across arrival cohorts.    
 
Halleröd (2003), study number 7, represents another variant of the same analytical 
framework. It is comparative as determinants of receipt 1986-87 as well as 1996-98 are 
studied. Data comes not only from registers but also from interviews and are in this sense 
richer than for other similar studies. The results show that when including variables 
measuring unemployment, income and receipt of transfers do coefficients for variables 
indicating immigrant status diminish. Still, foreign citizenship lead to higher probabilities of 
receiving social assistance. The results also shown that a household with given characteristics 
had lower probabilities of receipt 1996- 98 than in 1986-87. This development can indicate a 
lower propensity to apply for social assistance or that social assistance has become less 
generous / more stringent provided.
 18   
 
In two papers have Jörgen Hansen and Magnus Löfström studied social assistance receipt 
among immigrants and natives using balanced panels of adults and advanced econometric 
methods. One advantage with the research strategy is that from the onset it is clear that 
possibly selective return migration, most prevalent among immigrants from rich countries, 
can not affect results reported (while this might be the case in cross section studies). However, 
pay attention to that as many as approximately 40 percent all foreign born who live in Sweden 
2009 have arrived after 1996, the last year in their data, and are therefore not included in the 
studies.  
 
Hansen and Löfström (2003), study number 8, estimated a random effects probit model to 
uncover the patter leading to social assistance receipt. In their analyses are immigrants from 
countries sending many refugees, all being not rich, treated as a category separated from other 
immigrants. The results indicate that upon arrival do immigrants from refugee sending 
                                                 
18 These results are in agreement with results from Arslanogullari (2001) who used cross section data for 1990 
and 1995 in order to better understand reasons for the expansion of social assistance receipt across the two years.     
  12countries have considerably higher probabilities of receipt than other immigrants who in turn 
have higher probabilities than natives. By increased years of residency does probability of 
receipt fall, most quickly among immigrants from refugee sending countries. Immigrants who 
arrived at the end of the 60s and beginning of 70s have probabilities of receipt similar to the 
ones for natives only after a relatively long residency. Later arrived cohorts of refugees are 
predicted to have higher probabilities of receipt compared to earlier arrival cohorts after the 
same duration of stay, while such differences are smaller for other immigrants.         
 
Hansen and Löfström (2009), study number 9, define the three states receiving social 
assistance, receiving unemployment compensation and being employed and studied 
transitions into and out of the three states for males. In the analysis are in addition to natives 
three categories of immigrants studied: Refugees, Nordic immigrants and Other immigrants. 
While 8 percent of natives received some social assistance during the period 1990 to 1996, the 
corresponding proportion among refugee migrants was as high as 37 percent. A dynamic 
multinominal logit model is estimated controlling for initial conditions and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results indicate that particularly refugee immigrants display a greater 
degree of “structural”, or “true” state dependence than natives. The high degree of social 
assistance receipt among immigrants might be due to the existence of a “welfare trap” due to 
human capital depreciation or / and that social assistance receipt send a signal to potential 
employer indicating that the job applicant is less productive. In contrast participation among 




All studies surveyed up to now have in common that social assistance receipt is measure using 
yearly data and a person is defined as a recipient if living in a household that has received 
assistance at least during one month during a calendar year. This means receipt that last one 
month is treated the same as receipt with a duration of 12 months within the calendar year. 
The remaining studies listed in Table 7 have applied other definitions of receipt.  
 
Gustafsson (1998), study number 10, investigated the probability of entering social assistance 
receipt among males among those who became first time unemployed. Administrative data 
from the city of Gothenburg, and a 18 month follow up period was used. Results show that a 
long spell of unemployment, as well as the unemployed person not being eligible to 
unemployment benefits from an unemployment fund both greatly increases the probability of 
entering social assistance receipt. With increased age do probabilities of entering receipt 
decrease. Compared to those circumstances does a foreign citizenship have only small effects 
on receipt, see Table 9. 
 
/Table 9 about here/  
 
Gustafsson et al. (2002), study number 11, investigated the length of the status social 
assistance receipt as well as the length of the state of not reentering into receipt, measured in 
months for new recipients in an international comparison. Administrative data from cities 
located in Germany, Italy. Portugal, Spain and Sweden were harmonized and analyzed. A 
paradox was found: Recipients in cities with more generous benefit levels, that is cities 
                                                 
19 This is consistent with results reported by Nyblom (2008). This author analysed survey data from social 
workers concerning 372 recipients from four local governments in order to study their perception of barriers 
clients have to getting and receiving a job. The results showed that lack of education was most frequently often 
mentioned. Different from for natives barriers related to lack of motivation, lack of self-confidence or a difficult 
childhood were infrequently brought up for immigrants 
  13located in the north of Europe, were found to have shorter average spells of receipt than cities 
in the south of Europe where benefits are lower. This is shown in Table 10 where the 
descriptive results are reported. In some cities did immigrants have longer spells of receipt 
than natives even after controlling for age and family type. This was particularly the case in 
the Swedish cities. In contrast, in the Italian cities did immigrants have shorter spells of 
receipt than natives. This study also showed that a considerable proportion of people who exit 
social assistance receipt in the Swedish cities re-enter after some months of non-receipt.  
 
/Table 10 about here/   
 
In Section 5 did we report that the average number of months a household receives social 
assistance has trended up since the beginning of the 90s. This is a motivation for Bergmark 
and Bäckman (2004), study number 12, to investigate the dynamics of long term receipt, 
which the authors defined as receipt that has lasted for at least 10 month during a given 
calendar year.
 20 Probability models for leaving long term receipt and for reentering long term 
receipt was estimated using data for 1991 to 1998. The results indicate that controlling for 
year, age, education, household type and regional unemployment did a short period of 
residence in Sweden decrease the probability of leaving long term receipt as well as increase 
the probability of re-entering long term receipt.  
 
The last study for this survey, Mood (2009), study number 13, also investigates long term 
receipt defined in the same manner. Here the research question is: To what extent has 
immigrant household contributed to the expansion in the total number of long term recipients 
from 1990 to 2003? Using data from the capital Stockholm the author decomposes the 
increased long term receipt into three terms: Changes in the proportion of immigrants in the 
city, changes in long dependence among immigrant and changes in long dependence among 
natives. The results show that almost half of the increase in long term receipt can be attributed 
to increased proportion of immigrants in the population and a slightly lower proportion to 
increased long time dependence among immigrants. In contrast increased long term 
dependency among natives contributed only marginally to the total increase in long-term 
social assistance receipt in the total population.  
 
Results from the surveyed studies most often point in the same direction. Social assistance 
receipt among immigrants is relatively high shortly after immigration, but typically 
diminishes with years since immigration. There is much of heterogeneity in receipt between 
immigrants due to country of origin. The highest probabilities of receipt are found among 
immigrants from not rich countries from which many have entered as refugees, for similar 
reasons or due to family reasons. Studies that have investigated it have found that later arrival 
cohorts of immigrants tend to have higher rates of receipt than earlier arrived cohorts.  
 
 
8. Immigrants in labor market and the income safety net 
 
Following the literature and the general perception we claim that the relatively high use of 
social assistance among immigrants to Sweden can best be understood from the perspectives 
of immigrant’s lack of integration in the labor market at the destination. To a certain degree 
holes in the income safety net also play roles. Additional causes for a comparatively high rate 
                                                 
20 Since 2002 does the register of social assistance receipt at Statistics Sweden contain information on during 
which specific month during a calendar year social assistance is received. This will make more detailed studies 
on social assistance receipt possible, on this see Bergmark and Bäckman (2007)    
  14of social assistance receipt among immigrants is the demographic composition: A larger 
proportion of the foreign population are young adults or live in households with many 
children, categories in which social assistance receipt is above average. Furthermore it seems 
likely that immigrants own fewer assets and have lesser access to financial support from 
relatives and friends.
21 To this can be added that, disproportionally many immigrants reside in 
locations where relatively many households receive social assistance, and this might increase 
knowledge on the program as well as diminish stigma of becoming a recipient.
22  
 
As Sweden’s immigration population has grown in number and its labor market situation has 
become more worrisome, so has academic research on the topic expanded. For overview of 
the research filed see for example Ekberg (ed) (2004), Bengtsson et al. (2005) and Ekonomisk 
Debatt (2007). Although studies have focused on different labor market outcomes, on people 
of different origins and refer to different years, it is possible to tease out some key lessons 
from the research.  
 
One lesson, far from unique to Sweden, is that the labor market status of immigrants typically 
improves with years since immigration. This is consistent with typical findings in the research 
surveyed in the preceding section that rates of social assistance typically decrease with years 
since immigration. While immigrants assimilate into the labor market at the destination, in the 
Swedish case they also assimilate out of social assistance receipt. Another lesson is that 
studies based on large sets of more recent register data show that observed individual 
characteristics cannot fully explain gaps in labor market position between natives and 
immigrants, nor the deteriorating relative situation of immigrants. In contrast, among people 
in any given job there seems to be very little evidence of wage discrimination. Furthermore, 
there are no sign of immigrants being less active in the job search. Still they have higher 
unemployment rates and longer spells of unemployment.  
 
An important lesson from the research is that the main reason for immigrant’s unfavorable 
labor market status seems to be that they are less likely to be hired than natives. Results of 
several new field experiments show that a foreign name substantially decreases the 
probability to be called to an interview with a potential employer, see for example Attström 
(2007), Carlsson and Rooth (2007), Bursell (2007) or Ahmed and Ekberg (2009) the latter 
surveying field experiments also in other markets. Consistent with this register based research 
indicate that when an immigrant change his or her name to one signaling nativity this leads to 
higher income (Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2009). Furthermore, Åslund et al (2009) show 
that immigrants are severely underrepresented among managers and that hiring pattern of 
immigrant managers and native managers are very different; immigrant managers recruited 
immigrants to a much higher extent compared to what other managers did.    
       
While some kind of consensus seems to emerge on that the hiring decisions is a, or perhaps 
the, main reason for present labor market gaps between immigrants and natives in Sweden, it 
leads to new questions. Why do potential employers today discriminate towards job applicants 
with characteristics signaling foreignness, while for example during the 1950s employer’s 
                                                 
21 There is clear evidence that for many households in Sweden, applying for social assistance is considered an 
unattractive alternative. For an empirical study of this see Gustafsson (2002)  
22 Analysing parish data for persons aged 20 – 25 1990 to 1999 living in Stockholm Mood (2004) finds that rates 
of outflow from social assistance receipt as well as rates of inflow into social assistance receipt are affected by 
the level of social assistance receipt. Using a quasi experimental design Åslund and Fredriksson (2009) finds 
based on register data for 1990 to 2000 that social assistance dependency among refugees increases if the 
individual is initially placed in a parish with high rate of social assistance receipt.    
  15actively recruited foreign labor? One line of reasoning attributes much explanatory power to 
technical and organizational change. Today, there is much less demand for unqualified 
manual labor which is easy to transfer from one social environment to another. The 
knowledge based economy requires for example language skills and cultural competence 
which in many cases is not easily portable across national boarders.  
 
Furthermore, collective bargain has resulted in relatively high minimum wages in Sweden, 
reducing the demand of for example people who do not master the Swedish language. One 
could argue that in a hypothetical situation with a larger number of low paid jobs, a higher 
proportion of immigrants would have been employed. The problem with putting this forward 
as a policy advice is that trade unions goals are rather the opposite; to reduce wage 
differences. Alternative policy strategies are therefore more in line with traits of the Swedish 
model, a model which to a large extent can bee seen as the outcome of trade union action. 
One strategy of making the immigrant labor force more attractive is to upgrade it’s skills, 
another is to subsidized immigrant employment. Both measures incur costs for the public 
sector budget, and measured by in this way does the Swedish integration policy stand out as 
rather ambitious in international comparisons. Still most rich countries face smaller immigrant 
– native unemployment gap as Sweden, a paradox.  
 
We now turn to the income safety net. The Swedish system of unemployment insurance has a 
long history and is strongly related to the trade unions. Although formally different from the 
public sector, unemployment insurance societies are mainly funded by public resources. In 
addition, eligibility criteria and benefit levels are decided by the parliament after proposals 
from the government. To be eligible to unemployment benefits a worker must have a work 
record, actively search for work and be registered at the employment office. Benefits can be 
received during a period of 300 working days (450 days for parent to children under 18), after 
which they are terminated.  
 
The maximal unemployment benefit can amount up to 680 SEK (gross of income tax) per 
working day five days a week. This means that for some workers as much as 80 percent of 
income losses due to a layoff are replaced. Furthermore, workers placed in labor market 
programs receive benefits computed according to the same formula, although the benefit is 
labeled “Activity support” and is paid by the Social Insurance Office.  
 
However, other categories unemployed receive lower benefits. Some, due to lower previous 
earnings, are eligible to not more than the minimum level of 320 SEK (gross of income tax) 
per working day five days a week, and there are people in labor market policy measures who 
receive as little as 233 SEK (gross of income tax) per working day a week. This means that 
single persons having only such incomes will earn less than the norms used when assessing 
applications for social assistance (see Section 4). Still other categories of unemployed do not 
receive any unemployment benefit at all: People who have no previous work record, those 
who search for a short part time job, those who have not registered at the employment office 
as well as those who are not active enough in their job search.    
 
In short, one can say that the Swedish system of unemployment insurance in many respects 
works well for the insiders of the labor market, but not for outsiders. The latter category 
includes many recent immigrants, as well as school leavers. The situation is similar for the 
systems replacing income losses due to sickness and due to parental leave. While many native 
who becomes sick or a parent can count on relatively generous benefits, this is not the case for 
  16many immigrants experiencing the same events, as they have not previously established 
themselves in the labor market.  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that something similar is the case when it comes to access to 
labor market programs funded by the central government. (Lindmark, 2009) The 
shortcomings of the central government organized and funded labor market policy has since 
the 90s motivated many local governments to introduce their own labor market programs for 
social assistance recipients. (Ulmestig, 2007, Thorén, 2008). However, it appears that up to 
now progress in finding successful such measures that have been documented in a credible 
manner is lacking (Lundin, 2008). 
      
 
9.  Final comments 
 
This paper has aimed to provide a review of knowledge on social assistance receipt among 
immigrants in relation to receipt among natives in Sweden. We have described the immigrant 
population, the system of social assistance, provided statistical information on social 
assistance use by immigrants and natives as well as surveyed academic studies. Based on 
research we have also discussed how to interpret the findings.  
 
It has been shown that in present Sweden most of the out-payments for social assistance refer 
to foreign born persons a category make up 14 percent of the total population. This means that 
immigrants have considerably higher rates of receipt than natives. Immigrants also have 
longer periods of receipt than natives. To some extent can the high costs for social assistance 
received by immigrants be attributed to the need for maintaining refugees when they are 
newly arrived and during a few years thereafter. However, this is far from the entire story. Not 
only refuge immigrants have elevated rates of receipt at entry to Sweden. Although there 
seems to be a general pattern of immigrants to assimilate out of social assistance receipt, 
receipt continues to be higher than among in several characteristics identical natives many 
years after immigration among immigrants from not rich countries who have arrived during 
later decades.  
 
All evidence point towards that the elevated probabilities of social assistance receipt among 
immigrants from not rich countries are mainly due to failures of integrating into the labor 
market at the destination. In this sense does the high share of expenditures for immigrant 
social assistance mirror the problems migrants from not rich countries meet when trying to 
find a job. Policies for integrating immigrants into the labor market are also policies for 
reducing social assistance receipt among immigrants. Such policies can aim to make 
immigrants more attractive to hire due to increasing their human capital, or by subsidizing 
wage costs. However, we have here referred to results from new research that convincingly 
indicating that at the hart of problem is also the behavior of the person who recruits workers, 
typically a majority person. Measures to combat discrimination of immigrants at the labor are 
also measures to reduce social assistance receipt among immigrants. The integration policy 
should therefore not be a one sided task for the migrants, but also a task for the majority 
population.   
 
The Swedish social welfare model is a model where one qualifies by performing paid work. 
One could claim that in very few other countries are workers who face events like layoffs, 
sickness, invalidity and parenthood equally well protected from income losses. In contrast 
people who have no or only week work histories are referred to the last income safety net: 
  17social assistance. From this perspective it can be claimed that disparities in social assistance 
receipt between immigrants and the majority are due to the ambitious transfer systems. 
Similarly one could rightly claim that a fundamental reason for the large number of immigrant 
social assistance recipients is that they have been admitted to the country as refugees, for 
humanitarian reasons or as relatives to such persons. However, rolling back the welfare state 
as well as admitting dramatically fewer immigrants from not rich countries are not politically 
feasible measures to reduce the disparity in social assistance receipt between immigrants and 
the majority.  
 
We are thus arguing that the main strategy for reducing the gaps in social assistance receipt 
between immigrants and the majority can not be changes in the income safety net. Still, such 
changes can be motivated. For example labor market policy programs could be developed and 
better targeted towards immigrants receiving social assistance. Among social workers 
processing social assistance claims there seems to be a wide spread feeling that their clients 
are not always given the best treatment at the employment offices. We have also presented 
evidence indicating that in case social assistance norms were reduced in order to increase 
incentives to work, there is a large risk that poverty among immigrant children would worsen 
from a level already high. This speaks against a strategy of reducing social assistance receipt 
among immigrants by only focus on the generosity in the system of social assistance.    
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  23Table 1  
 
Number of foreign-born persons residing in Sweden January 1 2009, 20 largest sending 
countries    
 
 
Country of birth   Number   Country of birth  Number  
Finland  175 113  Chile  28 118 
Iraq  109 446  Thailand  25 858 
Yugoslavia    72 285  Somalia  25 159 
Poland    63 822  Lebanon  23 291 





  55 960  Syria  18 786 
Germany    46 854  China  18 256 
Denmark     46 167  Rumania  17 352 
Norway    44 310  United States  15 901 
Turkey    39 230  India  15 263 
    






























  24Table 2 
 
Norms for social assistance in effect since January 2009  
 
Individual part  
Age of person   SEK per 
month 
   < 1    year     1 520 
1 - 2    years     1 710 
      3    years      1 370 
4 - 6    years      1 640 
7 - 10  years      2 100 
11 - 14 years     2 410 
15  - 18 years     2 710 
19 -  20 years     2 740 
Single adult      2 800 
Married or cohabiting adults     5 060 
 
Part dependent of household size  
 
Number of household members (adults 
as well as children)  
SEK per month 
1      880 
2      990 
3    1 240 
4    1 420 
5    1 620 
6    1 850 
7    2 002 
8 and more     2 002 + 170 SEK for each person on 
addition to number 7  
 
Note: At the exchange rate prevailing in October 2003 1 SEK is equal to 0.11 EUR, alternatively 0.13 
USD or 14.7 JPY. 
















  25Table 3 
Social assistance in Sweden 1983 - 2008, some key numbers 
Year Number  of 
recipients  
(thousands)  
Rate of recipients  
Percent of the 
population  
Average number 




(Prices for year 
2008)  
1983  475  5.7 4.2 5  160 
1984  524  6.3 4.2 5  787 
1985  536  6.2 4.4 6  538 
1986  564  6.5 4.5 7  442 
1987  540  6.2 4.4 7  441 
1988  524  6.0 4.3 7  090 
1989  505  5.7 4.3 6  907 
1990  492  5.7 4.3 6  835 
1991  511  5.9 4.4 7  464 
1992  560  6.5 4.6 9  062 
1993  642  7.4 4.8 10  753 
1994  696  7.9 5.1 12  426 
1995  689  7.8 5.4 12  719 
1996  722  8.2 5.7 13  938 
1997  718  8.1 5.8 14  421 
1998  660  7.4 5.8 13  347 
1999  581  6.6 5.8 12  169 
2000  522  5.9 5.8 10  974 
2001  469  5.3  5.7    9 796 
2002  434  4.9  5.8    9 397 
2003  418  4.7  5.6    8 944 
2004  417  4.6  5.7    9 354 
2005  407  4.5  5.8    9 202 
2006  392  4.3  5.9    9 212 
2007  378  4.1  6.0    9 166 
2008  384  4.2  6.1    9 465 
Source: Socialstyrelsen (2003B) and Socialstyrelsen (2009B).    
Note: There are various breaks in the times series documented in the publications. For example up 
until 1989 people who received social assistance in more than one local government (for example due 
to migration) were counted more than once. Since 1993 does the statistics include introduction 












  26Table 4 
 
Social assistance receipt by age and country of birth 2008. Number and rates among 
















18 - 19  11 734    5   8 300    32 
20 - 24  29 813    6  17 858    20 
25 - 29  15 336    3  17 386    14 
30 - 39  20 182    2  34 344    14 
40 - 49  22 032    2  29 013    12 
50 - 59  14 490    1  17 826    10 
60 - 64    4 017    1    5 847      8 
65 - 74    2 773  <1    3 555      3 
75 -     2 126  <1    1 656      2 
Total   122 503    2  135 786    12 
































  27Table 5  
 
Estimated number of recipients and rates of social assistance receipt among adults and 
children 2003.  
 
  Number of persons in the 
population. 
 Thousands  
Rate of receipt 
Percent  
Adults   6 574   3.9 
Native born     
Both parents born in Sweden   4 363   2.9 
One parent born in Sweden 
one parent foreign born  
   309   4.0 
Both parents foreign born       140   7.5 
Foreign born     
Born in rich countries       542   6.9 
Born in not rich countries       293  23.7 
    
Children    2 059    7.0 
Native born     
Both parents born in Sweden    1 576    3.9 
One parent born in Sweden 
one parent foreign born  
     215    8.3 
Both parents foreign born         167  19.3 
Foreign born     
Born in rich countries          48  22.4 
Born in not rich countries          53  38.3 
   






















  28Table 6  
Estimated poverty reducing effect of social assistance for various population groups, 
2003. Percent of population groups under a poverty line.  
 
Population group and 
assumptions 
40 percent of median 
income  
50 percent of median 
income  
60 percent of median 
income  
Adults      
As if no receipt of 
social assistance 
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
 2.6   4.0   6.4 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
 3.5   4.8   8.3 
Both parents foreign 
born   
 5.8   8.0  11.8 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries    5.5   8.8  15.4 
Born in not rich 
countries  
16.1 22.1 31.8 
    
When considering 
receipt of  social 
assistance 
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
  2.0   3.3   6.1 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
 3.1   4.6   8.0 
Both parents foreign 
born   
 4.4   5.9  10.5 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries    2.9   5.7  13.3 
Born in not rich 
countries  
 7.0  13.6  26.2 
    
Proportion of 
individuals removed 
from poverty by Social 
Assistance  
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
0.6 0.7 0.3 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
0.4 0.2 0.3 
Both parents foreign 
born   
1.4 2.1   1.3 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries    2.6   3.1   2.1 
Born in not rich 
countries  
 9.1   8.5   5.6 
  29    
    
Children      
As if no receipt of 
social assistance 
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
 1.4   3.3   6.1 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
 3.8   5.5   11.4 
Both parents foreign 
born   
11.6 18.6 30.5 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries   13.9  21.3  32.3 
Born in not rich 
countries  
21.4 30.9 35.9 
    
When considering 
receipt of social 
assistance 
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
 1.3   2.5   5.6 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
 2.0   4.2   9.4 
Both parents foreign 
born   
 3.9  11.3  25.8 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries    4.7  11.0  24.7 
Born in not rich 
countries  
 2.6  12.2  26.1 
    
Proportion of 
individuals removed 
from poverty by Social 
Assistance  
   
Native born      
Both parents born in 
Sweden  
 0.1   0.8   0.5 
One parent born in 
Sweden one parent 
foreign born  
 1.8   1.3   2.0 
Both parents foreign 
born   
 7.7   7.3   4.7 
Foreign born      
Born in rich countries    9.2  10.3   7.6 
Born in not rich 
countries  
18.8 18.7   9.8 
    
Note: Estimates based on the Household Income Survey conducted by Statistics Sweden.  
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DATE AND  
PERIOD 









All adult persons 
living in Sweden   
Foreign nationality   Rates of receipt 
observed for a 
calendar year 
Time series.  
Survey data for 
1973 – 77, 
1982. 
 













All adult persons 
living in Sweden    
Primary: Foreign 
birth   
Rates of receipt 
observed for one 
and several 
calendar years 
1983 – 1992.  Given age are 
immigrant rates 
of receipt about 
3 times as high. 
Rates are high at 
entry, but 
decrease 







All adult persons 
living in Sweden    
Foreign birth   Probability of 
receipt observed 
for one calendar 
year 
1985 and 1990.  Probabilities of 






countries but fall 
by years since 
immigration.   
4.  
 
Franzén (2001)  
All adult persons 
living in Sweden   
Foreign birth    Probability of 
receipt observed 
for one calendar 
year 
1983 and 1995.  Probabilities of 






countries but fall 
by years since 








in Sweden  and 
their statistical 
“twins” 
Born in Sweden 
with  both parents 
born in the same 
region of the word 
Probability of 
receipt observed 















Persons aged 20 – 
64 living in 
Sweden   
Foreign birth  Probability of 
receipt observed 
for one calendar 
year. 
1990, 1995 and 
1999 pooled  
Probabilities of 




  31countries. In 









Halleröd (2003)  
Persons aged 20 – 
64 living in 
Sweden.  
Foreign birth 
Foreign nationality  
Probability of 
receipt observed 























Persons aged 18 – 
65 living in 
Sweden 1990.  
Foreign birth   Probability of 
receipt observed 
for one calendar 
year. 
1990 – 1996  Probabilities of 










not predicted to 










Males aged 18 – 65 
living in Sweden 
1990. 
Foreign birth   Transition into 








a greater degree 
of “structural” 
state dependency 






countries may be 
due to the 




among others is 
largely due to 







Males born 1932 to 
1979 not receiving 
social assistance 
but  entering 
unemployment 
during 1993 and 
1994 in the city of 
Gothenburg.  
Foreign citizenship  Entry into social 
assistance receipt 
during the first 







receipt is high 
for when 
unemployment 
has a long 









al. (2002)  
Households aged 
under 64  entering 
social assistance  in 
the city of 
Gothenburg April 
1991 to March 
1992 Helsingborg 
1989 and Barcelona 
(ES),  Bremen (D), 
Lisbon (P), Milan 
(IT), Turin (IT) and 
Vitoria (ES).   
Foreign citizenship  Duration of  
episodes during 
the first 42 
months   
1991 – 1995 
(Gothenburg) 
1989 - 1993  
(Helsingborg) 
Only in the 
Swedish and the 
German cities do 
immigrants have 
longer periods of 




















Sweden as a whole   Foreign born   Probability of 
leaving long term 
receipt (defined 
as receipt during 
at least 10 
months during a 
calendar year) , 
re-entry into long 
term receipt  
1992 - 1999  Variation over 
time is much a 











Adults living in the 
city of Stockholm  
Foreign born   Long term receipt 
(defined as 
receipt during at 
least 10 months 
during a calendar 
year) 
1990,  2003  Nearly half of 
the increase in 
the proportion 
long term 






and most of the 





  33contribution of 
natives to the 
increase in long 
term dependency 















































  34Table 8  
Probabilities of receiving social assistance in 1995 for a 40 year old single women having 
various characteristics. Percent    
 
Country of birth 
and number of 
years since 
immigration  
Level of education  
 Primary  Secondary  University  level   
Born in Sweden     8   5   1 
Born in a Nordic 
country 
   
 - 5 years   24  21  13 
 6 – 15 years    9    6    4 
16 – 27 years    3    3    1 
Born in a country in 
western Europe and 
Northern America    
   
 - 5 years   14  12   7 
 6 – 15 years    4    3    2 
16 – 27 years    2    1    1 
Born in a Eastern 
Europe  
   
 - 5 years    32   38  33 
 6 – 15 years    8     6    5 
16 – 27 years    3     3    3 
Born in a Southern 
Europe  
   
 - 5 years    68    73  69 
 6 – 15 years   24   17  13 
16 – 27 years   10     9    5 
Born in a Middle 
East 
   
 - 5 years     67  72  68 
 6 – 15 years    29  23  17 
16 – 27 years    13   11  12 
Born in other not rich 
countries  
   
 - 5 years    55  62  57 
 6 – 15 years   20  15  12 
16 – 27 years     9   7    8 
    
    
Source: Franzén (2001)  
Note: Calculation based on a estimated probability model.  It is assumed that the person is living in 
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Table 9  
Probabilities of receiving entering social assistance receipt within 18 months after 
entering unemployment for persons of different characteristics and length of 





Length of unemployment (months)   
  - 3.0  3.1 – 6.0  6.1 - 
Aged  25 – 34 years 
having compulsory 
schooling and    
   




7.4 10.0  17.9 
Swedish citizen and 
not entitled to 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
19.6 31.2 52.1 
- Citizen in East 
European country 
and entitled to 
Unemployment 
Benefit  
13.3 17.7 29.7 
Citizen in East 
European country 
and entitled to 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
32.0 46.8 67.8 
Aged at lest 55 years 
and having university 
education.   
   




  1.0   1.4    2.8 
Swedish citizen and 
not entitled to 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
  3.1  5.6  12.4 
    







  36Table 10 
Median duration of first cash episode of social assistance receipt by nationality in eight 
European countries. Months   
 






Spain   Barcelona    35.0  27.0   
Germany  Bremen          7.4   4.8  *** 
Sweden   Gothenburg     7.6   2.7  *** 
Sweden Helsingborg  10.2    3.7  *** 
Portugal    Lisbon  23.5 34.2   ** 
Italy  Milan    3.9   5.0     * 
Italy  Turin     4.0  6.3   ** 
Spain   Vitoria    14.5  11.5   
     
Source: Gustafsson et al. (2002 p 213).  
Note: *** indicates stat sign at least 1 percent level, ** at least 5 percent level, but not at 1 percent 
level, * at 10 percent, but not 5 percent level.  
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